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I. INTRODUCTION

When Elizabeth Warren, United States Senator for
Massachusetts, ran into Gavin Newsom, the Lieutenant Governor of
California, on her way to discuss the Dignity for Incarcerated
Women Act,1 his response was representative of the majority of
reactions she gets when she mentions the bill: “What? They do
that?”2 The Dignity Act, a bill that was introduced in Congress on
July 11, 2017, “would make a series of common-sense reforms to

1

S. 1524, 115th Cong. (2017), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115thcongress/senate-bill/1524/text.
2
C.J. Ciaramella, Bill Introduced in Congress to Ban Shackling and Solitary
Confinement of Pregnant Women, REASON.COM: HIT & RUN (July 11, 2017,
5:30 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2017/07/11/bill-introduced-in-congress-toban-shack.
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how the federal system treats incarcerated women.”3 One such
reform includes a ban on the use of restraints on pregnant inmates.4
Although at first blush it may seem like an archaic practice, the
shackling of pregnant inmates, even during labor, continues to be a
problem in the United States.
Despite adverse rulings by several courts, the practice of
shackling pregnant inmates persists, forcing women who were
pregnant and subjected to the use of restraints to litigate the issue in
hopes of restoring their dignity and attaining compensation for
lingering injuries caused by shackling.5 As established by the courts,
shackling pregnant inmates constitutes a condition of confinement
in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment.6 Several states have been proactive in enacting
anti-shackling legislation,7 and a bill has recently been introduced
in Congress which would ban the practice in federal prisons.8
However, despite adverse court rulings and a few state statutes, the
practice persists in those places that do not have legislation in place
to protect these women’s rights.9 For this reason, it is necessary that
both the federal government and state governments enact legislation
banning the practice, so that this human rights violation might be
eradicated, and so that the United States might be worthy of its
reputation as the land of the free.
This Note will demonstrate the detrimental effects of
shackling a pregnant woman and will examine some of the efforts
currently being made to prohibit the practice, as well as provide
some suggestions for prohibitory legislation. Part II of this Note will
discuss the background of this pervasive issue, both how it has been
viewed by the courts and the ways in which it has been dealt with
3

Senators Booker, Warren, Durbin, Harris Introduce Landmark Bill to Reform
the Way Women Are Treated Behind Bars, ELIZABETH WARREN: U.S. SENATOR
FOR MASS. (July 11, 2017), https://www.warren.senate.gov/?p=press_
release&id=1727.
4
Id.
5
See Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2013);
Nelson v. Corr. Med. Sers, 583 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009); Brawley v.
Washington, 712 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (W.D. Wash. 2010); Women Prisoners of the
D.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. District of Columbia, et al., 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C.
1994).
6
See cases cited supra note 5.
7
AZ, CA, CO, DE, D.C., FL, HI, ID, IL, LA, ME, MD, MA, MN, NV, NM,
NY, PA, RI, TX, VT, WA, WV. 2017 ACOG State Legislation Tally, Am.
Cong. of Obstetrics and Gynecology, https://www.acog.org/-/media/
Departments/State-LegislativeActivities/2017ShacklingTally.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20171029T2052480513.
8
S. 1524, 115th Cong. (2017), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115thcongress/senate-bill/1524/text.
9
Martin v. County of Milwaukee, et al., No. 2:14-cv-00200 (E.D. Wis. 2014)
(occurring in a state which, even in 2017, has not enacted anti-shackling
legislation).
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by state legislatures that have enacted anti-shackling laws. Part III
of this Note will analyze the positions of those who support a ban
on the use of restraints on pregnant inmates and detainees. Part III
will also address Martin v. County of Milwaukee, a case tried in July
of 2017 which concerns issues central to this Note. Part IV will
demonstrate the necessity of anti-shackling legislation and present
suggestions for legislators to consider when enacting a statute of this
kind.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Case Law

There are four major cases addressing shackling of pregnant
women: Women Prisoners of the D.C. Department of Corrections v.
District of Columbia, et al.10; Nelson v. Correctional Medical
Services11; Brawley v. Washington12; and Villegas v. Metropolitan
Government of Nashville.13 These cases are important in
understanding how this issue has progressed through the courts and
in establishing a base knowledge of existing precedent, which holds
that shackling is a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, and is thus a violation of basic
human rights.
In order to establish an Eighth Amendment claim, plaintiffs
are required to meet a relatively high bar. The courts have held that
in order to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and
unusual punishment, an inmate must satisfy a two-part test involving
both an objective prong and a subjective prong.14 The first prong,
the objective analysis, asks “whether shackling pregnant detainees
in the manner and under the circumstances in which Plaintiff was
shackled creates a substantial risk of serious harm that society
chooses not to tolerate.”15 In other words, “the shackling of pregnant
detainees while in labor [must] offend[] contemporary standards of
human decency such that the practice violates the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against ‘cruel and wanton infliction of
pain’…”16 The courts recognize that prison is not intended to be
“comfortable,” so “only those deprivations denying the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form

10

See Women Prisoners of the D.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. District of Columbia, et
al., 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994).
11
Nelson v. Corr.l Med. Servs, 583 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009).
12
Brawley v. Washington, 712 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (W.D. Wash. 2010).
13
Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2013).
14
Id. at 571.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 574.
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the basis” of a Plaintiff’s claim.17 As to what exactly constitutes a
contemporary standard of decency, the courts will look to expert
opinion, “but such information does not define the ‘constitutional
minima’ and ‘cannot weigh as heavily in determining contemporary
standards of decency as the public attitude toward a given
sanction.’”18
The second prong, or the subjective portion of the analysis,
asks “whether the officers had knowledge of the substantial risk,
recognized the serious harm that such a risk could cause, and,
nonetheless, disregarded it.”19 Thus, the plaintiff asserting an Eighth
Amendment claim for shackling during pregnancy must establish
“that prison officials acted with ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate
health or safety.”20 There are several ways an inmate might prove
deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials. For example,
a plaintiff may introduce “circumstantial evidence” which could
allow a jury to find that “a prison official knew of a substantial risk
from the very fact that the risk was obvious.”21 In addition, a
plaintiff may demonstrate that “the risk was ‘longstanding,
pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials
in the past, and the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official
being sued had been exposed to information concerning the risk and
thus “must have known” about it.”22 Although it is possible for a
prison official to claim ignorance, he or she “may not refuse to
investigate facts or inferences that he strongly suspects indicate the
existence of a condition which violates the Eighth Amendment.”23
i.

Women Prisoners

Women Prisoners of the D.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. District of
Columbia, which was certified as a class action in December of
1993, was brought by and representative of “all women prisoners
who are incarcerated in the District of Columbia correctional system
as of October 1, 1993, and all women prisoners who will hereafter
be incarcerated in the D.C. correctional system.”24 The class alleged
many different forms of abuse against the D.C. correctional system,
including shackling pregnant inmates during pregnancy, labor, and
postpartum recovery.25 One such inmate, identified as Jane Doe L,
was forced to give birth in her jail cell after jail officials refused to
17

Women Prisoners of the D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 877 F.Supp. at 663.
Id. at 664.
19
Villegas, 709 F.3d at 575.
20
Women Prisoners of the D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 877 F.Supp. at 664.
21
Id. at 664.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
See Women Prisoners of the D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 877 F.Supp. at 638-39.
25
Id. at 646-47.
18
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transport her to the hospital, despite the fact that her contractions
were a mere five minutes apart.26 Almost immediately after she
delivered her baby, “guards placed her in handcuffs and leg shackles
and sent her by ambulance” to the hospital.27
In examining the case, the court found additional evidence
of the use of restraints on pregnant inmates.28 For example, “[a]
physician’s assistant stated that even when a woman is in labor ‘their
ankles and their hands are cuffed.’”29 It was also common practice
to restrain pregnant inmates by means of “leg shackles, handcuffs
and a belly chain with a box that connects the handcuffs and the
belly chain” while transporting them to medical appointments.30
Presented with these facts, the court found that shackling
pregnant inmates while in labor and during postpartum recovery was
inhumane, and thus a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Eighth
Amendment.31 In particular, the court held that these practices
“violate[d] contemporary standards of decency.”32 However, the
court did limit its finding by stating that instances in which a woman
had a history of escape or assault may qualify as acceptable reasons
for shackling.33 In addition, the court only took issue with shackling
during labor and immediately following.34 It found no problem in
utilizing leg shackles during the third trimester of pregnancy, but did
state that “the physical limitations of pregnancy and the pain
involved in delivery make complete shackling redundant and
unacceptable in light of the risk of injury to a woman and baby.”35
ii.

Nelson

Shawanna Nelson had, to say the least, a harrowing
experience as a woman who was pregnant when arrested and
delivered her child while incarcerated.36 When the time came to
deliver her child, Nelson was shackled during transport to the
hospital, her legs were shackled to the wheelchair upon arrival, and
both of her ankles were shackled to her hospital bed.37 By the time
she was given a hospital bed, Nelson’s cervix was dilated to 7
centimeters, meaning she was in the final stages of labor when her
26

Id. at 646.
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 668-69.
32
Id. at 668.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 524 (8th Cir. 2009).
37
Id. at 525.
27
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ankles were shackled to both sides of her hospital bed.38 Each time
a nurse came to measure her cervix, her shackles were removed and
then replaced as soon as the nurse had finished.39 Nelson was forced
to endure all of this despite the fact that she “did not present a flight
risk or any other security concern.”40 In fact, “[the Officer’s] own
testimony indicate[d] that she was aware that shackling a woman in
labor was hazardous and contrary to medical needs.”41 Nelson’s
shackles were finally removed just before she was taken to the
delivery room, but only at the doctor’s request.42 Nelson alleged that
being shackled before, during, and after labor caused severe
repercussions, including: extreme mental anguish and pain,
permanent hip injury, torn stomach muscles, an umbilical hernia
requiring surgical repair, damage to her sciatic nerve, injured and
deformed hips, inability to sleep or bear weight on her left side or
sit or stand for extended periods, and inability to have more
children.43
Interestingly, the Arkansas Department of Corrections had
policies in place which should have suggested to the officers that
shackling Nelson was inappropriate.44
For instance,
“Administrative Regulation 403 … stated the ADC policy that
shackles were to be used ‘only when circumstances require the
protection of inmates, staff, or other individuals from potential harm
or to deter the possibility of escape.’”45 In addition, “any officer
responsible for transporting an inmate to a hospital [was required]
to ‘use good judgment in balancing security concerns with the
wishes of treatment staff and the medical needs of the inmate’ before
shackling an inmate during a hospital stay.”46 Yet, despite these
policies, the officers shackled Nelson, and, as a consequence, she
sustained serious permanent injuries.47
In reviewing Nelson’s case, the court first examined whether
the officer who shackled Nelson had acted with deliberate
indifference.48 The court found that the Officer should have been
aware of the risk of harm to Nelson and her unborn child.49 This,
coupled with the Officer’s own testimony that she would not shackle
a pregnant woman due to the possibility of adverse health
38

Id.
Id. at 526.
40
Id. at 534
41
Id.
42
Id. at 526.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 527.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 526.
48
Id. at 528.
49
Id. at 529-531.
39
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consequences, was central to the court’s determination that the
Officer had acted with deliberate indifference.50
Next, the court considered whether the constitutional right
which Nelson asserted was established at the time the event at issue
took place.51 Not only did the court find that Nelson’s right to be
free from restraints during pregnancy, labor, and delivery had been
clearly established by lower courts, it also found that it had been
acknowledged by the Supreme Court of the United States.52 In
making this determination, the court considered several cases,
including Women Prisoners.53 The court reasoned that because the
federal district court’s decision regarding the use of restraints on
pregnant inmates in Women Prisoners had not been appealed by the
government, a constitutional violation in such a case had been
clearly established.54 Accordingly, with both the deliberate
indifference element and the clearly established right element of the
offense satisfied, the court held that Nelson’s Eighth Amendment
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment had been
breached.55
iii.

Brawley

In 2006, Casandra Brawley was incarcerated in the
Washington State Corrections Center for Women.56 At the time, she
was five months pregnant.57 Each and every time Brawley was taken
to a prenatal medical appointment, “she was placed in full
restraints,” which included “a metal chain around her waist [with]
her hands […] handcuffed together, and the handcuffs were attached
to the waist chain.”58 Although the Officer who transported Brawley
to the hospital when she went into labor admitted she did not
consider her a security risk, Brawley was placed in handcuffs and a
waist chain, with the two restraints attached.59 When Brawley was
given a hospital room, the chain and handcuffs were taken off, but
the officers chained one of her ankles to her hospital bed.60 When
she was moved to a delivery room, Brawley’s ankles were chained
to her wheelchair.61 She was unchained and then re-chained after her
50

Id.
Id. at 531.
52
Id. at 533.
53
Id. at 532-533.
54
Id. at 533.
55
Id. at 534.
56
Brawley v. Washington, 712 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1211 (W.D. Wash. 2010).
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 1212.
60
Id. at 1213.
61
Id.
51
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epidural, and her restraints were finally removed just prior to her
emergency cesarean operation.62 After her surgery, her ankle was
again chained to the bed.63 Even when Brawley was taken to the
NICU to see her newborn child, she was chained to her wheelchair.64
Perhaps one of the most troubling portions of Brawley’s
experience occurred when her newborn son was in a bed in her
hospital room and began to make choking or vomiting noises.65 Had
she been free, Brawley could have quickly gotten up from her bed
and administered the help the infant clearly needed. 66 But since
Brawley was chained to her bed, her only option was to call for help
and trust a nurse would arrive in time.67
The court found that Brawley had indeed been forced to
“endure[] unnecessary pain, was exposed to a sufficiently serious
risk of harm, and had a serious medical need when she was shackled
to the hospital bed….”68 Further, the court held that “Common
sense, and the DOC’s own policy, tell us that it is not good practice
to shackle women to a hospital bed while they are in labor.”69 In
other words, it should have been common sense not to shackle a
pregnant woman in labor. Thus, the first element of the court’s
analysis, that Brawley had a serious medical need, had been clearly
satisfied.70
In examining whether Brawley’s right to be free from
restraints during labor was an established constitutional right, the
court found that “by April of 2007 shackling inmates while they are
in labor was clearly established as a violation of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”71
That is, by the time Brawley experienced this treatment, her right to
be free from such degrading practices had been clearly established
and was protected by the Constitution.72 Despite this, Brawley, like
others both before and after her, was forced to endure this violation
of her basic human rights.
iv.

Villegas

Juana Villegas was nine months pregnant when she was
arrested for driving without a driver’s license and then detained
62

Id. at 1213-1214.
Id. at 1214.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 1219.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 1220.
71
Id. at 1221.
72
Id. (citing Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 533 (8th Cir. 2009)).
63
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when it was found that she did not have adequate immigration
documentation.73 Just two days after being booked into the jail,
Villegas went into labor.74 She was transported to the hospital in
handcuffs and leg restraints.75 Upon arrival at the hospital, her
handcuffs were taken off, but one of Villegas’ legs was shackled to
her hospital bed.76 One of the nurses told the officer that Villegas
should not be restrained, but the officer ignored her.77 Villegas was
un-shackled and re-shackled at multiple points throughout both
labor and postpartum recovery.78
The court, like others, evaluated Villegas’ case using a
combination of conditions of confinement and serious medical
needs analyses.79 The court found both that shackling posed a risk
of harm to Villegas and that “the shackling of pregnant detainees
while in labor offends contemporary standards of human decency
such that the practice violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’…”80 Thus,
Villegas’ right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment had
been violated. However, the court held that “…the right to be free
from shackling during labor is not unqualified.”81 In so finding, the
court listed two exceptions: (1) restraints may be used if the inmate
posed a flight risk; and (2) restraints may be used if the inmate poses
a substantial risk of harm to herself or others. 82
B.

State Legislation

Thus far, only 22 states and the District of Columbia have
adopted legislation banning the practice of shackling pregnant
inmates.83 The American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology has
listed six areas which it suggests states address in enacting this type
of legislation.84 These are:

73

1.

Broadly restrict restraints during labor,
delivery, postpartum and transport to a
medical facility;

2.

Allow medical personnel to have restraints

Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 566 (6th Cir. 2013).
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 567.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 571.
80
Id. at 574.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
See supra note 7.
84
Id.
74
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removed immediately;
3.

Require
written
documentation
by
corrections personnel of the use of restraints;

4.

Apply to juveniles;

5.

Require corrections personnel to remain
outside delivery room for privacy concerns;
and

6.

Address additional health concerns of
pregnant inmates (including adequate
prenatal care, appropriate maternal nutrition
and nutrition counseling, HIV and substance
screening and treatment).85

Each state with legislation limiting the use of restraints has
addressed the first category in its coverage.86 However, fewer states
cover fewer categories as the list continues.87
In 2010, The Rebecca Project for Human Rights and the
National Women’s Law Center partnered to create a state-by-state
report card reviewing several aspects of reproductive care provided
to incarcerated women.88 One of the areas reviewed was the use of
restraints during pregnancy. At the time of the report, only ten states
had adopted laws addressing shackling.89 The report found that
thirty-six states had failed to “comprehensively limit, or limit at all,
the use of restraints on pregnant women during transportation, labor
and delivery and postpartum recuperation.”90 Of the states lacking
any statute dealing with the practice of shackling, “[t]wenty-two
states either have no policy at all addressing when restraints can be
used on pregnant women or have a policy which allows for the use
of dangerous leg irons or waist chains.”91 Equally as shocking,
“eleven states either allow any officer to make the determination [to
use restraints for security reasons] or do not have a policy on who
determines whether the woman is a security risk.”92 Perhaps most
unsettling of all, “[t]hirty-four states do not require each incident of
85

Id.
Id.
87
Id.
88
Mothers Behind Bars: A state-by-state report card and analysis of federal
policies on conditions of confinement for pregnant and parenting women and
the effect on their children, Nat’l Women’s L. Center (Oct. 2010),
https://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/mothersbehindbars2010.pdf.
89
Id. at 6.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 7.
86
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the use of restraints to be reported or reviewed by an independent
body.”93
One aspect of policies against restraining pregnant women
that seems to be shared by the courts, by advocates of anti-shackling
legislation, and by the states, is the inclusion of exceptions to a
prohibition of the practice.94 In general, these exceptions are: (1)
restraints may be used if the woman poses a significant risk of harm
to herself or others; and (2) restraints may be used if the woman
poses a flight risk. For example, New Mexico’s statute regarding
shackling pregnant inmates states:
“A. An adult or juvenile correctional facility,
detention center or local jail shall use the least
restrictive restraints necessary when the facility has
actual or constructive knowledge that an inmate is
in the second or third trimester of pregnancy. No
restraints of any kind shall be used on an inmate
who is in labor, delivering her baby or recuperating
from the delivery unless there are compelling
grounds to believe that the inmate presents:
(1) an immediate and serious threat of harm to
herself, staff or others; or
(2) a substantial flight risk and cannot be
reasonably contained by other means.
B. If an inmate who is in labor or who is delivering
her baby is restrained, only the least restrictive
restraints necessary to ensure safety and security
shall be used.”95
Thus, states consider exceptions to a blanket prohibition on the use
93

Id.
See Nelson, 583 F.3d at 533; Villegas, 709 F.3d at 574; G.A. Res. 70/175,
annex, at 48(2), Nelson Mandela Rules, (Dec. 17, 2015); Health Care for
Pregnant and Postpartum Incarcerated Women and Adolescent Females,
Comm. Op. No. 511, at 4, AM. COLL. OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS
(2011), https://www.acog.org/Resources-And-Publications/CommitteeOpinions/Committee-on-Health-Care-for-Underserved-Women/Health-Care-forPregnant-and-Postpartum-Incarcerated-Women-and-Adolescent-Females; An
“Act to prohibit the shackling of pregnant prisoners” model state legislation,
AM. MEDICAL ASSOC. (2015), https://www.amaassn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/specialty%20group/arc/shacklingpregnant-prisoners-issue-brief.pdf; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 33-1-4.2 (West); Tex.
Gov’t Code Ann. § 501.066 (West); Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 361.082
(West); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 28, § 801a (West); N.Y. Correct. Law § 611
(McKinney); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17-1-113.7 (West 2006); Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 72.09.651 (West).
95
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 33-1-14.2 (West, Westlaw current through the end of the
Second Regular Session of the 53rd Legislature).
94
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of restraints to be imperative to the success of implementation of
this type of legislation.
C.

FEDERAL LEGISLATION
i.

Federal Bureau of Prisons

In 2008, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“FBOP”) instituted
policy against shackling pregnant inmates.96 However, the FBOP
only exclusively banned the use of belly chains.97 With regard to
such other restraints as handcuffs and leg shackles, the FBOP left
the decision to the discretion of prison officials.98 This discretion is
not unqualified, however, and restraints are generally not considered
necessary unless the inmate poses a significant risk of harm or a risk
of escape.99 These exceptions are analogous to those in state
legislation discussed above.
ii.

Congress

On July 11, 2017, the Dignity for Incarcerated Women Act
(the “Dignity Act”) was introduced in the Senate and referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary.100 Sponsored by Senator Cory Booker,
along with Senators Elizabeth Warren, Richard Durbin, and Kamala
Harris, the bill would mandate significant changes in multiple areas
concerning health care and basic rights for incarcerated women.101
In particular, it calls for a complete ban on the use of restraints on
pregnant women:
“A Federal penal or correctional institution may not
use instruments of restraint, including handcuffs,
chains, iron, straitjackets, or similar items, on a
prisoner who is pregnant.”102
Thus, the bill includes none of the exceptions that most state
statutes, court opinions, and model bills do, nor does it provide for
detainees. Although admirable in its attempt to institute a complete
ban on the use of restraints on pregnant federal inmates, the bill is
unlikely to pass without at least some exceptions to the blanket rule.
The perception that inmates may be dangerous and may attempt
96

FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT: ESCORTED
TRIPS, NO. 5538.05, at 11(a) (Oct. 6, 2008),
http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5538_07.pdf.
97
Id.
98
Id. at § 570.44.
99
Id.
100
See supra note 1.
101
Id.
102
Id. at § 4050(d)(2).
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escape if left unrestrained is too pervasive for a complete ban to pass
a bipartisan Congress.
III. ANALYSIS
A.

Leading health and civil rights organizations, as well as
the United Nations, oppose shackling pregnant inmates.

The American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
(“ACOG”), one of the leading voices against the use of restraints on
pregnant incarcerated women, has listed multiple ways in which the
imposition of restraints might harm both the mother and her child.103
The complete ACOG table listing some of the various potential
consequences associated with shackling is reproduced on the last
page of this Note and includes such medical risks as: heightened risk
of falling and lessened ability to break a fall; hindered ability of
medical professionals to examine the woman in labor; increased risk
of injury if the mother suffers from seizures brought on by
preeclampsia; decreased ability to move around in order to alleviate
pain; and hindered ability of medical professionals to prepare the
woman for emergency situations such as a cesarean delivery.104
The ACOG has acknowledged that the FBOP, US Marshals
Service, and other organizations have established policies against
shackling, but “[t]hese standards serve as guidelines and are
voluntary, not mandatory. State and local prisons are not required to
abide by either the Federal Bureau of Prisons policy or the National
Commission on Correctional Health Care standards…”105 Without
mandatory requirements for jails and their staff, the basic rights of
American women will continue to be infringed upon.
The American Medical Association (“AMA”) has also lent
its voice to those speaking against the use of restraints during
pregnancy. The AMA’s Advocacy Resource Center formulated a
report on the use of shackles on pregnant inmates in 2015, finding
no justified reason to continue the custom.106 Not only did the AMA
point out that “[t]he vast majority of female prisoners or detainees
are … non-violent offenders,” it also found that “[w]hile states
103
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justify using restraints to prevent escapes, no women in labor have
ever attempted escape.”107 At its 2010 Annual Meeting, the AMA
“adopted policy condemning the practice of shackling pregnant
prisoners” and recommended the AMA formulate a model bill.108 In
so doing, the AMA expressed approval of New Mexico’s antishackling statute (reproduced above).109 In its model legislation, the
AMA provided for the very same exceptions that most states and
courts have encouraged – significant risk of harm and risk of escape
– and considers these to be rare occasions.110 However, “[t]he AMA
model state legislation extends the shackling prohibition to the
second and third trimester due to safety risks shackling poses to
pregnant women…”111 Thus, the AMA model legislation is slightly
more comprehensive than those employed by most states.
The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) has also
worked to end the practice of restraining pregnant inmates and
detainees. According to the ACLU, the risk of adverse consequences
of shackling a pregnant mother are unacceptable both to the
pregnant woman and to her child.112 In its own words, “Shackling
pregnant women is dangerous and inhumane. Although widely
regarded as an assault on human dignity as well as an unsafe medical
practice, women prisoners are still routinely shackled during
pregnancy and childbirth.”113 The ACLU does not take this issue
lightly, as evidenced by their representation of Shawanna Nelson in
her fight for justice.114 Like the AMA, the ACLU reported that not
one state with a policy or statute against the use of shackles had
“reported any escapes or threats to medical or correctional staff from
pregnant prisoners since prohibiting shackling.”115 Further, the
ACLU categorizes the practice as “degrading, unnecessary, and a
violation of human rights.”116
Perhaps most persuasive, the United Nations itself has
adopted anti-shackling rules in its Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners, which were renamed as the Nelson Mandela
Rules in December 2015.117 The rule states: “Instruments of restraint
107
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shall never be used on women during labour, during childbirth and
immediately after childbirth.”118 The United States of America is a
member of the United Nations, and as a member, is charged with an
obligation to “promote solutions of international economic, social,
health, and related problems” (emphasis added).119 These standard
rules formulated by the UN were considered by that body to be
necessary in order to advise Member States on “good principles and
practice in the treatment of prisoners and prison management.”120
However, the United States clearly has not taken this crucial portion
of the Nelson Mandela Rules seriously. America cannot truly be
considered a protector of human rights unless and until it
implements such standard minimum rules outlined by the Nelson
Mandela Rules for the treatment of pregnant female inmates and
detainees.
B.

Martin v. County of Milwaukee, et al.

In 2013, Shonda Martin was pregnant and became
incarcerated in the Milwaukee County Jail.121 Martin was subjected
to horrific sexual assault during this time by Officer Thicklen, one
of the employees at the jail.122 Not only did he assault her while she
was pregnant, he immediately resumed his attacks after she
delivered her baby.123
As if not enough for Martin to be subjected to abuse by
Officer Thicklen, Martin was also shackled by one wrist and one leg
restraint throughout labor.124 Only the leg restraint was removed
while Martin delivered her child.125 Martin’s case was tried by a jury
in July of 2017. As to her Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
claims for the sexual assault committed against her by Officer
Thicklen, the jury awarded her $6.7 million.126 However, as to her
shackling claim, the jury awarded her nothing.127
Martin’s failure to exact justice on her shackling claim stems
from the tactics employed by her counsel. In her original complaint,
Prison Management in line with Human Rights,
https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/GARESOLUTION/E_ebook.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2018).
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Martin categorized the use of restraints during her pregnancy as an
Eighth Amendment violation.128 However, in her amended
complaint, Martin categorized her claim as a Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process violation.129 The flaw lies here. Because
she relied on the Fourteenth Amendment for this claim, the test
employed by the court was different. Whereas an Eighth
Amendment claim requires a complainant to demonstrate that an
official was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need,
Martin’s Fourteenth Amendment claim required her to demonstrate
that the jail had a policy that was not reasonably calculated to
achieve a legitimate goal, and as a result of this policy, Martin
suffered harm.130 Although the jury did find that the use of shackles
was not reasonably calculated to achieve a legitimate purpose, it also
determined that Martin had not suffered any harm.131 This is
arguable in itself, as Martin most likely did suffer some extent of
mental and emotional harm as a result of being shackled throughout
labor, delivery, and postpartum recovery. However, considering the
practically identical facts between Martin and the cases discussed
previously – Women Prisoners, Nelson, Brawley, and Villegas –
Martin almost assuredly would have prevailed if she had brought the
proper Eighth Amendment claim. The error here lies with the
choices made by her counsel.
It is important to note that shackling is an Eighth
Amendment violation, and that a jury specifically found it did not
breach Martin’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights.132 Had
pregnant inmates’ right to be free from shackling been established
as a principle protected by Due Process, it would have automatically
been recognized across the country.133 No state would be able to
infringe upon this basic right of female prisoners.134 However,
because it was not a Fourteenth Amendment right under substantive
due process, it is necessary for the federal government to enact
legislation to keep shackling from being used against pregnant
female prisoners and detainees in federal prisons. Additionally, it is
necessary for states to enact prohibitory legislation in order to
protect state and local inmates.
Despite Martin’s loss with regard to the unconstitutional use
128
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of shackling during her pregnancy, this case is important to
demonstrate that this problem is tangible and continually existent in
the United States. Martin’s case is analogous to those which came
before, proving that the policy and practice is widespread. Without
legislation to prevent this practice from occurring, the basic human
rights of these already underprivileged women will continue to be
infringed. As a result, not only will the health of the mother be
endangered, but the health and life of her unborn child.
IV. ARGUMENT
An examination of the cases involving shackling claims of
pregnant inmates and detainees might suggest that it is agreed and
established that shackling is wrong.135 From that conclusion, one
could naturally assume that because it is an established
constitutional violation, the federal and state governments would
take steps to prevent similar instances from occurring. However,
only 22 states have implemented legislation protecting female
prisoners from this practice.136 Senator Cory Booker, one of the
proponents of the Dignity for Incarcerated Women Act, blames this
absence of action on a lack of discourse surrounding the practice.137
This lack of dialogue must be remedied, because in reality, the facts
are these:

135

•

60% of women in state prisons were previously victims of
abuse.138

•

The overwhelming majority of women arrested are taken
into custody for non-violent offenses. In fact, violent offense
arrests constituted only 17% of women arrested in 1998.139

•

Overall, women account for only about 14% of violent
offenders. Men count for almost 6 times this number.140

•

Of female violent offenders, 75% committed mere simple
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assault. 141
•

Approximately 950,000 women were involved with the
criminal justice system in 1998. In other words, 1 out of
every 109 adult American women.142

•

An estimated 6% of women committed to local jails were
pregnant at the time, and an estimated 5% of women
committed to state prisons were pregnant when admitted. 143

•

Approximately 3% of women in local jails received prenatal
care once admitted, compared to about 4% of women in state
prisons.144

The number of women in the criminal justice system
continues to increase.145 The vast majority of these women are nonviolent offenders.146 In addition, a majority have been past victims
of physical or sexual abuse. 147 Our criminal justice system receives
these women, commits them to confinement, and then shackles them
to their wheelchairs and hospital beds while they give birth to their
children, as if they were no better than animals. This method of
punishment – cruel and unusual punishment to be precise – shows
them that not only were they worthless in the minds of those who
abused them, but they are also worthless in the eyes of the criminal
justice system, those employed by the criminal justice system, and
the greater American people.
Although it might at first seem like common sense to allow
a woman to be free from restraint during such a critical time as labor,
delivery, and postpartum recovery, the preceding cases demonstrate
that this is not the truth. In order to protect the rights of these women,
who themselves may not be able to adequately defend their cause,
we must ensure that this practice is banned, and that those who
breach this ban will be liable for the human rights violation they
have committed. The incarcerated women who suffer these
instances of punishment are themselves serving time in order to
establish justice for their wrongs. It is only fitting and in conformity
with American principles of justice that those who commit offenses
against these women are also held liable for their actions.
141
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Further, as explained by the ACOG, the policies
implemented by the FBOP, US Marshals Service, and similar
institutions are insufficient to guard women in either federal prisons
or in state prisons.148 This is because they are not mandatory
standards, but merely suggest appropriate conduct.149 In order to
protect female inmates and detainees from the use of shackles
throughout the course of pregnancy, mandatory provisions, i.e., state
and federal legislation, must be put in place to more effectively
regulate the conduct of those overseeing these women.150
However, as the courts and others have found, the right to be
free from restraint is not and should not be unqualified. This Note
recognizes that there are certain rare but necessary circumstances in
which restraints might be used, and recommends that all states and
the federal government enact legislation banning the practice of
shackling pregnant inmates similar to that employed by New
Mexico.151 Yet, a few necessary changes should be made to this
statute.
First, the “compelling grounds” on which an inmate might
be subjected to the use of restraints should be defined. Such
definition should include a non-exhaustive but exemplary list of the
unusual circumstances that might justify the use of restraints. In
addition, if one of those compelling grounds is found by a prison
official, the official should seek the agreement of at least two other
prison officials as to whether or not restraints should be utilized.
Further, any use of restraints as a result of one of the compelling
grounds should be documented in a report submitted by the official,
and signed by the two officials who agreed restraints should be
utilized.
Second, section (B), which allows for the least restrictive
restraints necessary if a pregnant inmate or detainee is shackled,
should be amended to prohibit all use of restraint during delivery of
the child. The potential health risks and the woman’s interest in
being free from restraints during the intense stress of childbirth are
such that restraints should never be used during this time.
Third, the statute should expressly provide for the liability of
those who breach a woman’s constitutional right to be free from
restraint during pregnancy. An inmate’s right to be free from the use
148
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of restraints and therefore from cruel and unusual punishment
should not be taken lightly. It is necessary to notify those that might
engage in restraining a pregnant inmate that they could potentially
face liability for their actions in order to ensure the end of this
practice.
In formulating anti-shackling legislation, it is recommended
that legislators examine the American Medical Association’s model
bill titled “An Act to Prohibit the Shackling of Pregnant
Prisoners.”152 The model bill provides:
“Section 4. Requirements. Restraint of Prisoners
and Detainees
(a) An adult or juvenile correctional institution
shall use the least restrictive restraints
necessary when the correctional institution
has actual or constructive knowledge that a
prisoner or detainee is in the second or third
trimester of pregnancy. No restraints of any
kind shall be used on a prisoner or detainee
during labor, transport to a medical facility,
delivery, and postpartum recovery unless
there are compelling grounds to believe that
the prisoner or detainee presents:
(1) an immediate and serious threat of harm
to herself, staff or others; or
(2) a substantial flight risk and cannot be
reasonably contained by other means.
(b) Under no circumstances shall leg or waist
restraints be used on any prisoner or detainee
who is in labor or delivery.
(c) If restraints are used on a prisoner or detainee
pursuant to subsection (a), the corrections
official shall make written findings within ten
(10) days as to the extraordinary circumstance
that dictated the use of the restraints to ensure
the safety and security of the prisoner or
detainee, the staff of the correctional
institution or medical facility, other prisoners
or detainees, or the public. These findings
shall be kept on file for at least five (5) years
152
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and be made available for public inspection,
except that no information identifying any
prisoner or detainees shall be made public in
violation of [insert relevant section] without
the prisoner or detainee’s prior written
consent.
Section 5. Enforcement. Notice to Prisoners and
Detainees
(a) Within 30 days of the effectiveness of this Act,
all correctional institutions in [State] shall
develop rules pursuant to this Act.
(b) Correctional institutions shall inform
prisoners and detainees of the rules developed
pursuant to subsection (a) upon admission to
the correctional institution and … post
policies or practices pursuant to this Act in
locations in the correctional institution where
such notices are commonly posted, including
common housing areas and medical care
facilities.
(c) Within 60 days of the effectiveness of this Act,
correctional institutions shall inform prisoners
and detainees within the custody of the
correctional institution of the rules developed
pursuant to subsection (a).”153
The AMA’s model bill provides for many of the suggestions
made by this Note. However, the language of the model bill should
be altered to provide for those recommendations not included by the
AMA. For example, “compelling grounds” should be defined in the
definitions section of the statute. The definition should include a
non-exhaustive but exemplary list of the rare circumstances which
might allow for the use of restraints. Also, section (b) of the bill
should be amended so that leg or waist restraints may not be used at
any time during a woman’s pregnancy. Nonetheless, taken as a
whole, the AMA’s model bill is a good example of model legislation
for states and the federal government to consider when enacting
anti-shackling statutes.
V. CONCLUSION
Although it presents itself as the “land of the free,”
America’s reputation does suffer from more than one example of
human rights abuse. One such abuse is the use of restraints on
153
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pregnant inmates and detainees. This practice has been denounced
by the United Nations, by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, by multiple
United States courts, and by multiple states.154 However, as
evidenced by Martin v. County of Milwaukee, the practice still
persists. In order to end this violation of the Eighth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States and protect the rights of these
already underprivileged women, it is necessary for both the federal
government and individual state governments to enact legislation
banning the practice. Not only must the practice be banned, antishackling legislation must provide for the liability of those who
breach a woman’s right to be free from restraint during pregnancy,
labor, delivery, and postpartum recovery. America cannot attempt
to establish principles of freedom and justice throughout the rest of
the world if those same principles are not recognized and protected
at home.

154

See G.A. Res. 70/175, annex, at 48(2), Nelson Mandela Rules, (Dec. 17,
2015); FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT:
ESCORTED TRIPS, NO. 5538.05, at 11(a) (Oct. 6, 2008), available at
http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5538_07.pdf; Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of
Nashville, 709 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2013); Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs, 583 F.3d
522 (8th Cir. 2009); Brawley v. Washington, 712 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (W.D. Wash.
2010); Women Prisoners of the D.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. District of Columbia, et
al., 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994); 2017 ACOG State Legislation Tally, Am.
Cong. of Obstetrics and Gynecology (Mar. 2018), https://www.acog.org//media/Departments/State-LegislativeActivities/2017ShacklingTally.pdf?dmc=1&ts=
20171029T2052480513.

23

AMERICA: LAND OF THE SHACKLED

VOL. II

Box 2. Examples of the Health Effects of Restraints
Nausea and vomiting are common symptoms of early pregnancy. Adding the discomfort of
shackles to a woman already suffering is cruel and inhumane.
It is important for women to have the ability to break their falls. Shackling increases the risk of
falls and decreases the woman’s ability to protect herself and the fetus if she does fall.
If a woman has abdominal pain during pregnancy, a number of tests to evaluate for conditions
such as appendicitis, preterm labor, or kidney infection may not be performed while a woman is
shackled.
Prompt and uninhibited assessment for vaginal bleeding during pregnancy is important. Shackling
can delay diagnosis, which may pose a threat to the health of the woman or the fetus.
Hypertensive disease occurs in approximately 12-22% of pregnancies, and is directly responsible
for 17.6% of maternal deaths in the United States. Preeclampsia can result in seizures, which may
not be safely treated in a shackled patient.
Women are at increased risk of venous thrombosis during pregnancy and the postpartum period.
Limited mobility caused by shackling may increase this risk and may compromise the health of the
woman and the fetus.
Shackling interferes with normal labor and delivery:
•The ability to ambulate during labor increases the likelihood for adequate pain management,
successful cervical dilation, and a successful vaginal delivery.
•Women need to be able to move or be moved in preparation for emergencies for labor and
delivery, including should dystocia, hemorrhage, or abnormalities of the fetal heart rate
requiring intervention, including urgent cesarean delivery.
After delivery, a healthy baby should remain with the mother to facilitate mother-child bonding.
Shackles may prevent or inhibit this bonding and interfere with the mother’s safe handling of her
infant.
As the infant grows, mothers should be part of the child's care (ie, take the baby to child wellness
visits and immunizations) to enhance their bond. Shackling while attending to the child's health
care needs may interfere with her ability to be involved in these activities.
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